Five years ago, immediately after the 2014 European elections I wrote a piece for a small Italian political magazine of the Fondazione Critica Liberale and forgot about it. A piece in today's New York Times reminded me about it so I re-read it. Within limits (for "UKIP", read "Brexit Party") I think it's better now than it was then. It (obviously) failed to pick up up on Jeremy Corbyn you can sense the anxiety in my voice...
astrolabio ukip: just a “one-man band”?
paul tout
“…and always keep
a-hold of Nurse For fear of finding something worse”
From “Jim” by Hilaire Belloc
In his award-winning 3-part BBC
series ‘The Power of Nightmares’ the documentary film maker Adam Curtis asserts
from the outset that the picture of Al-Qaeda as America’s bogeyman is none
other than a mirror image of that which exists in the minds of fundamentalist
Islamists throughout the world who, perhaps rightly, see their values, mores
and traditions threatened by the globalising onslaught of a
diametrically-opposed “West” that is setting out to sweep away morals, theisms
and barriers to “free” thought. The substitution of the (fallen) USSR
with a new and more insidious enemy, is, he suggests, nothing other than a plot
by western governments to maintain control over an increasingly fractious and
individualistic populace.
How far can this model, which has
its critics, help to explain the spread of what has been facilely-labeled and
oversimplified as ‘xenophobia’ in the liberal European press and, in
particular, account for the rising star of Nigel Farage and his United Kingdom
Independence Party (UKIP)? Why has the European Union come to be seen as little
more than a bogeyman by a substantial slice of the British populace (and,
indeed, the British seen as a bogeyman by EU arch-integrationalists)? What is
different in the UKIP 15 approach in the current political and economic
situation to that exhibited by extreme right-wing parties (such as Nicholas
Griffin’s British National Party and its earlier manifestation, the National
Front) which, after a series of false dawns, failed to gain any parliamentary
representation and whose single European MP, Griffin himself, was not re-elected in the
recent poll? What does Farage want? What processes have allowed him to come to
the fore? Do the British really want what they voted for or was the UKIP vote,
not unlike that for Renzi in the opinion of many, merely a reflection of a lack
(or the removal) of alternatives?
“There but for the
grace of God…”
The manifest failure, post-2008, of
the Euro currency (at least as far as its Mediterranean participants and
Ireland were concerned) and southern European youth unemployment together with
Italy’s catastrophic relative industrial decline and indebtedness have not gone
un-noticed in Britain. They have in fact, been seen as a vindication of the
UK’s less-than-hidden Euroscepticism and Gordon Brown’s only saving grace is
painted as having been to keep the UK out of the Euro against the will of his
then boss, Anthony Charles Lynton Blair. The EU has ALWAYS had an image problem
throughout northern Europe, at least since the 1986 expansion which took in
Spain and Portugal and the undercurrent of anti-Latin sentiment has always been
strong, not only in Britain. The dire economic straits in which the PIGS (even
the acronym!?) found themselves was seen as a moral judgment on their economic
and social rectitude, although perhaps more by the States who found themselves
directly dealing with the mess, Germany to the fore, rather than by Britain
which adopted a quasi-Latin quantitative easing with gusto and recommended it at every opportunity (and much to German
annoyance).
Prior to this débâcle, while Spaniards, Italians and Greeks were perceived (and
directly measured) as being happy to delegate decision-making to Brussels (seen
as more honest and organised than their domestic politicians) the northern arc
viewed a “swarthier” administration and body politic with suspicion, no more so
(but not exclusively) than in Britain. Geography conspired too, and the British
were not the only country to avail themselves of a Schengen Area opt-out, Ireland
doing so as well.
Basic conceptions differ too, along
with geography and the two parts have different judicial bases, with Europeans
being seen as “subject” to Roman / Napoleonic law as against British “Common
Law” which sets the citizen free and not subject to the authority of the State
if the latter does not demonstrate his (or her) guilt; English Common Law
adhering to the broad principle that everything is permitted unless
specifically forbidden (the rest being regulated by the constraints of custom
and manners). In contrast, the Napoleonic code loosely starts from the opposite
premise and is utterly alien to the British mindset. It may seem to be
nitpicking but the Anglo-Saxon premise against a “nanny” State was and remains
strong, as evinced by the absence of an Identity Card (introduced and then
abolished for both World Wars, and proposed once again by that man Blair but
scrapped at the start of the current parliament), a citizen’s “residence”
(other than for electoral, medical or communication purposes) or the need to
carry some form of proof of identity, right down to the police not having a
“right” to randomly stop motorists not actually committing an offence. The idea
of unelected centres of power actually legislating is inconceivable. (Nota bene, the British monarch is,
obviously, unelected as is the House of Lords but any laws are proposed by the
elected government or by a private member of the House of Commons). As Farage
would say (using his catch-phrase) the EU, indeed Europe
itself, is, simply, “Baffling!” to the British, and vice versa.
This century has seen a fundamental
change in the organization (‘The Common Market’) that British citizens chose to
remain in by a large majority (67%) in 1975 (having joined in 1973). The Maastricht and Lisbon
treaties and the various opt-outs 17 negotiated (Schengen, the Euro, et al)
have reinforced the UK ’s
status as something of a sociopolitical ‘Galapagos’, isolated, but not
completely so, (and, Farage would say, “not enough!”) from the changes going on
apace within Europe . The most manifest change,
electorally exploited to the full by UKIP, has been that of the net inward
migration of EU citizens to the UK, perhaps as many as 2 million (and
additional to those arriving from outside the EU, half as many again) which has
seen the population rise more than 10% to almost 64 million in just 20 years.
That Britain as an economy has
benefitted from this influx of young, largely single taxpayers without
dependents, is almost undeniable but, in spite of this, the benefits accruing
to individuals (and communities) with access to the ballot-box are far less
clearcut if you don’t employ an Italian au
pair or a pair of Spanish gardeners. Housing is in desperately short supply
in the economically ‘hot’ parts of the south-east and England (as opposed to Great Britain )
is rapidly becoming the EU’s most crowded country. While relatively low-paid
work in these areas seems easy to come by (and youth unemployment is low by EU
standards at 20%) the purchasing power of this segment of the population (but
with a vote) has been static or declining for many years when housing costs are
included. Farage knows this and has exploited it ruthlessly, snapping up the
votes of people who, traditionally at least, would have voted Labour but see
Miliband’s “soft” integrationist and pro-EU stance as being against their
interests (which include easy access to a reasonably well-paid, low-skilled job
with a decent disposable income, a family doctor and schools).
“Speak softly, and
carry a big stick.” – Theodore Roosevelt
Although not completely
mutually-exclusive, via family ties, the second group coalescing around the
UKIP leader (but not his minions, it remains very much a one-man band,
something it shares with Italy ’s
M5S) is very different. Older, wealthier and drawn from traditional
Conservative (and conservative) ranks, these are people towards the end of
their working careers or retired who are ill-at-ease with the rapid changes
they have witnessed in British society including the admirable rise of
‘political correctness’, racial tolerance and inclusivity that have 18 marked
the years since Tony Blair first came to power but which perhaps began with the
fall of Margaret Thatcher.
Now a threatened species, but,
like-it-or-not, beacons of white British male political incorrectness, such as
the BBC motoring journalist Jeremy Clarkson, although periodically slapped-down
by his bosses, are immensely popular. The chainsmoking, beer-swilling,
wise-cracking Farage taps into this vein to great effect, occupying a similar
ecological niche in humorously sailing close to the wind but, unlike Grillo,
using measured tones and kind words whilst, at the same time, making his inner
thoughts perfectly clear, at least to native speakers. He plays an
‘inclusiveness’ blinder too, with a German wife. (“Anti-German? Who me?”)
His chosen lieutenants, for the
moment at least, lack this finesse
and this has undoubtedly hobbled UKIP. Cameron and the Conservatives, however,
cannot lean back and laugh at Labour and find themselves in a bind. The easiest
solution would be to wheel out their old anti-EU, anti-European Commission,
anti-gay marriage, anti-immigration sentiments that dominated party thinking
until 1990 and reconquer that lost vote but at the same time they risk losing
the votes they have gained from more conservative ethnic minorities and wealthy
young people voting with their wallets, rather than their hearts. Anti-EU
sentiment is not the only factor favouring the rise of the UKIP vote. ‘Islamaphobia’
which has waxed and waned in Britain following 9/11, rose again following the
terrorist attacks on the London public transport network before falling once
again. A series of recent high profile news stories on, among other things, the
perceived Islamisation taking place in State-funded schools, the undeclared use
of halal-slaughtered meat (in
accordance with Islamic traditions) in schools, supermarkets and canteens, difficulties
encountered in extraditing or expelling hardline muslim fundamentalists and
violent criminals from the UK, (difficulties coincidentally attributed to EU
rulings and its UK interpretation, the ‘Human Rights Act’) and a dreary, tragic
series of ‘honour’ killings have all raised xenophobic fears and contributed to
UKIP’s success.
What does Farage want? Can anyone
ever truly read a politician’s mind? What would he settle for? He’s probably
unsure himself. He currently presides, rather like Grillo, over an
undisciplined and rag-tag ‘Barmy Army’ which may wither away as rapidly as it
came to the fore. If anything the party apparatus is weaker, older and less
solid than Grillo’s M5S and certainly less established than Le Pen’s Front National. For the moment Farage
has successfully subsumed Griffin ’s
British National Party / National Front voters, telling them to put on a jacket
and tie, cover their tattoos and let their hair grow a bit!
Is UKIP here to stay? It’s hard to
say, but as a federalist consensus condenses along the middle Rhine
it is increasingly putting legislative and philosophical water between itself
and the isolated beasts on the ‘Galapagos’. How isolated that British position
actually is will only become clear at the next French elections. One thing is
sure however, that, like the grit in a clam, he’s an irritant in the UK’s body
politic that is producing a hard, shiny (but largely white) pearl of
Euroscepticism which the politicians of the main parties will have to take
account of, Clegg’s Liberal Democrats being it’s most notable victim. The
latter seem to have imploded utterly, compromised by decisions forced on them
in coalition that have adversely affected students and young people (notably
the rise in further education tuition fees to £9,000 per year) and, having lost
the solid support they obtained in the big University cities in the last
general election, seem destined to another period in the political wilderness
that characterized Liberal fortunes for much of the 20th Century.
That said, the EU elections in Britain remain
the non plus ultra of political
protest voting. Just a week after the European elections Cameron halted the
Farage bandwagon at Newark where the incumbent Conservative, Patrick Mercer,
had resigned over ‘cash-for-questions’ impropriety and UKIP only managed to
finish a solid second, well ahead of Labour. The May 25th surge was not
maintained. It remains to be seen whether British voters who chose Farage to
represent them in the EU Parliament want the same person running the country?!
Many die-hard Italian federalists I
talk to, mostly nice people with nice jobs in the public sector, continue to
paint British Euroscepticism as some sort of national defect and that an
unbridled Europhilia should be the normal state of affairs. Both will have
their expression, healthy or otherwise, in a debate about what the entire
European Project involves. The Franco-German axis, with tacit Latin support,
has made sure that the British have been manifestly unable to command the debate
but the elections in May 2014 have left Euroscepticism in a healthier state
than ever as the European Project has brought about mass migration as well as
large-scale industrial relocation eastwards, putting pressure on blue collar
purchasing power and creating mass youth unemployment in the south. Perhaps the
REAL problem in Europe (and especially the EU) is the lack, thus far, of a
democracy deficit, the democracy deficit illustrated by Ireland’s enforced
re-vote on the Lisbon treaty or the suppression of the Dutch and French “No”
votes on the European Constitution, in which the Superstate feels its peoples
OUGHT to vote in a particular fashion. Perhaps the citizens of Europe, France
and Britain in particular, not to mention the Greeks, need to be sent back to
vote once again so that they come back with the “right answer”. I’m sure that,
when sober, arch-federalist Jean-Claude Juncker would agree, especially with
Farage, Grillo, Tsipras and Le Pen there to chase them back to the fold.